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The paper constitutes a summary of my attempts, during the past 15 years, to understand
contemporary Quakers and Quakerism. The issue on which I focus is the difficulty in
representing Quaker identity given the heterogeneity of Quaker belie( During the last decade I
have found three approaches useful in analysing this problem. In the first place, I found that
Quaker identity is revealed through their talk in and around Meeting. Although each individual
friend has a unique biographical trajectory, this talk tends to be both storied and thematic.
Furthermore, such narrative discourse is coloured by one particularly pervasive character of
canonic Quakerism: the plain. Quakers have always preferred the plain to the embellished or
ornamented-both in their theology, their speech and in their material culture. I extend my
earlier work on plaining here by reference to the work of Webb Keane and Bruno Latour.
Third, and finally, I describe how the work of Pierre Bourdieu and especially his work on
habitus and practice theory has contributed to the way in which I understand the enduring
character of the Quaker Meeting.
KEYWORDS
Quakerism; narrative; identity; plaining

INTRODUCTION

'What is a Quaker?' This is the apparently simple question that I have been trying
to answer for over a decade. It is a question which I believe requires a multiperspectival approach. Quakerism is a subtle and complex process, one that
cannot be determined either by individual or social agency. Furthermore, I
assume from the outset that in order to understand Quakerism it is necessary to
understand Quaker faith and practice and this is only possible in terms of the
individuality of particular Quakers. As Tony Cohen avers in a different context,
how can we possibly understand the social (Quakerism) if we make no effort to
understand the individual (Quaker) (Cohen 1994)? How, indeed?
The issue of Quaker identity is problematic in two senses. On the one hand it
would appear to be a problem, a practical problem one might say, for Quakers
themselves. This is so because of the heterogeneity of Quaker belie£ Indeed,
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Quakers seem often to see the problem as a solution or in any case as a cause for
celebration (Dandelion 1996). It is a celebration with distinctly postmodern overtones in that a creedless Quakerism allows considerable scope for variation in
belief and practice. With its explicit avowal of the importance of individuality,
Quakerism would seem to be a religion for today. Quaker identity is, furthermore, sociologically problematic. Given that the Religious Society of Friends has
sustained its identity for 350 years, how has this been possible? How can a
voluntary organisation like the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) sustain a
coherent identity without charter or creed-without an overt, unifying ideology?
In this article I revisit three perspectives that I have myself developed during the
past ten years or so: 'narrative', 'plaining' and 'habitus'. Together, these quite
different means of interpretation when brought together result in a synergy that
helps us further understand Quaker identity and may illuminate religious identity
more generally.
MEETING NARRATIVES

During ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in a Quaker Meeting in the north of
England (given the pseudonym 'Dibdenshaw') I was struck, at first, by the irony
of the sheer quantity of talk at Meeting. I later described this talk in typically
anthropological terms, as a tripartite event comprising a 'before', a 'during' and an
'after', each relating to the 'fixed point' of worship itself (Collins 1994). The
quantity of talk was both intriguing and, from a fieldworker's point of view,
alarming. How to make sense of it? After many months of fieldwork, it was clear
that the talk was neither heterogeneous (i.e. not entirely random) nor homogeneous (i.e. determined by some narrow purpose, e.g. spiritual development). The
idea eventually dawned on me that that the talk was purposeful and orderly: the
Meeting was, I found, alive (and enlivened) with stories. I argued for the first
time (Collins 1994) that however else one might characterise the Quaker Meeting, narrative is at least partially constitutive of it. In other words, without stories
the Quaker Meeting (and necessarily therefore, Quakerism) is nothing. I sketched
out nine 'threads' (it is interesting how often the metaphor of weaving is used in
presenting narrative analyses). However, I further noticed that while talk tended
to be about straightforwardly substantive topics (music, Meeting, 'business',
football, gardening, family, travel, and so forth) they could be more interestingly
characterised in terms of certain tensions: inward/ outward, inclusive/ exclusive,
sacred/ profane, faith/ practice, unityI diversity, individualityI corporate, tradition/
change, equality/hierarchy, unity/diversity (Collins 1994: 416). All talk, I argued,
could be characterised as an exploration or attempt to resolve these tensions. I
argue, further, that these particular tensions have characterised Quaker faith and
practice since the beginning of the movement in the 1650s. Although talk may
have varied as to precise subject matter, Quakers have always been talking these
tensions and it is that, above all else, which determines their identity as Quakers.
Quakers are less interested in resolving these tensions than they are in exploring
them-they constitute what is centrally important to Quakers as Quakers. At the
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time I imagined that I was mapping the foundations of Quakerism but realise now
that this, despite its analytical 'looseness', is still too deterministic. My theory was
that all religions might be characterised by the 'tensions' their talk exposed. This
may be true but would take considerable comparative work to prove.
In my first published paper (1996a) I attempted to develop further the idea that
Meeting is constituted primarily in and through narrative. Although I discovered
that the Quaker Meeting could be modelled in a variety of more or less fruitful
ways, narrative seemed increasingly to be that which bore the greatest verisimilitude to Meeting as I experienced it as a participant observer. Developed as a
strategy for understanding texts in literary criticism, narrative analysis had become,
during the 1980s and 1990s, an increasingly widely used means of social analysis;
for instance, in sociology (Franzosi 1998), history (White 1987), psychology
(Sarbin 1986), psychiatry and psychotherapy (Spence 1983; Schaefer 1992), law
(Jackson 1990), political theory (Roberts 2004), economics (McCloskey 1990)
and organisation theory (Roe 1994). One characteristic shared by these disciplines, however, is their focus on written texts. In each case, it was a matter of
merely applying a mode of analysis common in interpreting novels to other forms
of printed texts. Extending this mode of analysis to talk was a relatively straightforward second step to take.
Indeed, in my initial analysis I took what can now be seen as a rather conservative view of narrative form, placing it entirely in talk, conversation and spoken
dialogue. As I continued to rake through my fieldwork notes, I saw that narrative
threads were sustained through the material culture of the Meeting House. I
realise that this is not, at first, at all easy to understand and that empirical examples
are more likely to convince. For example, the narrative 'pacifism' was communicated not only through discussions of the annual peace vigil and related issues, but
also through the peace vigil itself, in which 'pacifism' as discourse was embodied
by those Quakers who processed from the Meeting House to the steps of the
town hall where they lined up alongside one another and behind banners. I might
add here (after Cohen 1986) that this was indeed a vernacular narrative as it presented itself to onlookers and also to those in the procession-in the case of the
latter, in particular, there were just as many prototypical narratives as there were
individuals-in other words, there is demonstrated an external homogeneity (the
message of pacifism) and simultaneously, an internal heterogeneity-though some
individual narratives would be bound to overlap. The story of pacifism was further narrated through posters around the Meeting House (one including a quote
from Martin Luther King) and from leaflets and flyers deriving from organisations
like QPS (Quaker Peace and Service), CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and CAAT (Campaign Against the Arms Trade). I have already written in
rather more detail about the pacifism narrative as developed during the weeks
preceding Remembrance Sunday-indicating how the three narrative levels come
together, both substantively and analytically (Collins 2003: 257-58). Each of these
elements contributes, constructs, reconstructs the narrative 'pacifism'-a single
instantiation can be plotted on the model, indicating the extent to which it is
individual, vernacular or canonic.
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These narratives, spun with varying degrees of vigour and creativity by all participants in Meeting, were not, however, 'free-floating'. They were threads which
no sooner spun were woven into the social fabric of the Meeting and of Quakerism more generally. They are woven (either by the narrator or audience, and
most often by both) into the fabric of Quakerism, into the testimonies-those
fundamental narratives which arc grounded in the faith and practice of the first
Quakers and rehearsed in innumerable ways since then throughout the Quaker
movement. I became increasingly interested in what appeared to be different
'levels' of narrative. Clearly the stories I heard were presented by individuals,
either alone, or in consort-family members, for instance, might present an
almost choral performance telling of a holiday in Spain. Then there were those
stories which seemed already to exist, or rather which formed an existing context
into which the narratives of individuals were embedded. These contexts were, I
argue, of two kinds-the local and the national-although I feel it is rather misleading to base them on crude spatial co-ordinates. This is the primary reason for
calling them 'vernacular' and 'canonic' in that these terms speak more of 'reach',
'status', 'authority' and 'power'. Local or vernacular narratives include 'Oak
House' (a Quaker nursing home situated not far from the Meeting House), 'the
old Meeting House' (out of which the Meeting moved in the 1960s), 'Meeting
history' and so forth. National or canonic narratives coincide approximately with
the 'testimonies'-a moral code including 'pacifism' and 'social justice', for example. These narratives are codified in texts legitimated by the group as a whole. I
have outlined the ways in which these stories (and 'story levels') arc articulatedand would argue that they have been, and indeed are, brought together under
one religio-moral roof-an important issue which I return to below.
Although I suggested earlier that Quaker narratives might be understood in
terms of their 'distribution', it took me some time to work out how to plot these
'levels'. I came eventually to plot Quaker discourse within a space bounded by
three points, each representing a 'level' of discourse: the canonic, the vernacular
and the prototypical (or individual). This model was helpful in that it pointed to a
means of transcending the individual/ social dichotomy which has always plagued
sociology and anthropology. In this model, each narrative spun by an individual
Quaker is always and already a part of a vernacular and canonic narrative (Collins
(2002a, 2003, 2004). The point in this triangular space at which a narrative is
plotted in inevitably approximate, and indeed different agents might plot each
narrative differently. In any case, each narrative is necessarily prototypical, vernacular and canonic-and what is more, has in every case the potential to become
more or less any of these. At the same time, it is true that the model is misleadingly static. It is the work carried out constantly by Quakers that provides for and
ensures the vernacular and canonic character of the narratives generated by
individuals.
Let me provide an ethnographic example. An established Quaker testimony
related to the 'right use' of the world's resources: this is a canonic narrative. One
way in which this is so is its presentation and development in the text Quaker
Faith and Practice (QFP). Crucially, then, this means that the discourse of
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'sustainability' is a component part of QFP. It has been legitimated (given
authority) at Yearly Meeting, that is, at the highest tier of Quaker decision
making, and is therefore incorporated into QFP which cornrnits to writing what
might be seen as 'essential Quakerism'. The text, substantially revised every 25
years or so, comprises texts extracted from a variety of Quaker sources, including
minuted decisions and comments recorded during Business Meetings, passages
from the writing of individual Friends and so forth. QFP is distributed both to
Quaker Meetings and to individuals-most often when they are accepted into
membership. In the current edition, Chapter 25 is entitled 'Unity of Creation'
and deals especially with environment or 'green' concerns. For instance, the first
extract is from the works ofJohn Woolman (a noted eighteenth-century Quaker),
who wrote in 1772: 'The produce of the earth is a gift from our gracious creator
to the inhabitants, and to impoverish the earth now to support outward greatness
appears to be an inquiry to the succeeding age' (QFP 1995: 25.01).
During the course of my fieldwork, discourse relating to the right use of
resources (green issues) was being generated through a number of initiatives. For
instance, several Friends persuaded the Meeting to establish a 'wild garden' at the
rear of the Meeting House. This involved a good deal of discussion both within
and outwith formal Business Meetings. Reference was made both to Quaker
testimonies (primarily as presented in QFP) and also to local agencies involved in
sustainability issues. Before very long, an idea mooted by an individual participant
had become a local or vernacular narrative. Further threads woven into this narrative was the decision to replace all bulbs in the Meeting house with 'long-life'
bulbs which, it was agreed, were less objectionable than the existing high-wattage
bulbs. During the same period, reports were given to preparative Meeting relating
to green issues discussed at various Quaker Meetings, conferences and workshops.
In this way, the individual's stories and those of the Quaker movement as a whole
are mediated (and sometimes metamorphosed) by the Meeting, that is, at the level
of the vernacular.
PLAINING: FROM PRODUCT TO PROCESS

Although I believe that the creation and exchange of stories is a key element of
Quaker faith and practice, I suspect that there is something more, something
which patterns these narrative threads so that each derives from and contributes to
the more or less coherent discourse called Quakerism. The pattern is 'plain'.
Quakers have always exhorted one another to be 'plain' and others have often
characterised Quakerism in terms of the plain. Indeed, the proscriptions multiplied
to such an extent in the late seventeenth century as to stir Margaret Fell/Fox to
rail against the whole shebang. And, certainly, the plain (or simple) is well represented in the key canonic text. For instance, the 41" of the current Advices and
Queries:
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Try to live simply. A simple lifestyle freely chosen is a source of strength. Do not be
persuaded into buying what you do not need or cannot afford. Do you keep
yourself informed about the effects your style of living is having on the global
economy and environment? (QFP 1995)

Let us focus on the first sentence, which urges the reader to 'Try and live simply'.
Clearly, this calls for an extraordinary interpretive effort on the part of individual
Quakers, given the steady growth of consumer capitalism at least since 1900. The
question is whether it is possible in any absolute sense to live simply in the Britain
of the twenty-first century. Is it possible, nowadays, engulfed as we are by consumer culture, to make consistent choices between the plain and not plain any
more: do we have the cognitive powers to make the millions of choices necessary
to fulfil properly our obligation to 'live simply'? There seems little doubt that
early Friends believed they were up to the task-with a little help from their
Friends. It must have been a help to individuals to be told which commodities
could be acquired without blighting one's attempt to live the simple life. Even so,
predominantly middle-class Quakers were left to make innumerable choices. Up
until now, it seems that we are clearly dealing with particular products-with
individual items (from coats with cross-pockets to umbrellas, from the use of
certain pronouns to playing the flute) that are deemed 'prohibited'!
This is a claim built on empirical grounds and is hardly controversial. The
common-sense view would have it that the world comprises two types of thing:
the plain and the not-plain. This resolutely objectivist view holds that it is the
world (comprising complete and clearly delineated 'things') that imposes itself on
the individual. There is a disturbing inevitability about characterising Quakers in
this way. One becomes a Quaker and is then taught or told which bits of the
world are plain and therefore acceptable. In this view, Quakers are almost entirely
passive individuals, except that they need to identify and set aside those things
which are intrinsically 'not-plain'. The corporate character of Quakerism must
once have been of practical help here, at least up until the mid-nineteenth century. There then came a point at which Business Meetings could no longer name
the not-plain on a case-by-case basis: is gaslight plain or not? And what about
bicycles, automobiles, patios, aubergines and cameras? Given the rapid increase in
the number and variety of consumer goods, naming the not-plain on a one-byone basis became an impossible task.
After the mid-nineteenth century, what had been implicit was necessarily made
explicit: the centrality of 'the plain' to Quaker faith and practice gave rise to the
associated process, that is, plaining. Plaining is a learned and cognitive tendency to
classify the world in terms of the distinction plain/not-plain. Quakers, as they
mature, become more or less conscious of practising such discrimination. I
remember a long conversation between Friends after one Meeting for Worship in
2003 which was explicitly about the pros and cons of various cars. I have time
here only to note that the comments could only be understood in the context of
the Quaker tendency to plain. The fact that each Friend involved in the conversation preferred a different car in no way weakens my argument: plaining is a process which enables Quakers to justify the choices they make. For instance, a
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commodity which might seem far from plain to one Friend can be justified as
plain in terms of its good safety record, because of the savings it will generate in
the long run or because of the employment its manufacture provides. The criteria
used to define the plain or not-plain are neither fixed nor essential. There is
nothing necessary about, or inherent in, those things which are perceived to be
plain. Things are constructed as plain by Friends.
I have tried to show the relevance of this idea to our understanding of Quaker
identity in two ways-by giving empirical examples, that is, by presenting
examples of plaining in action as it were; and by showing how Quaker plaining
meshes with processes that have been identified as more all-embracing. I will
present three examples of theories which seem to lend plausibility to my idea of
plaining, two of which (the work of Peter Auksi and Wolfgang Welsch) I have
presented before (2001), while the third (drawing on the work of Bruno Latour
and Webb Keane) is presented here for the first time.
It was something of a revelation to come across Peter Auksi's brilliant Christian
Plain Style: The Evolution of a Spiritual Ideal (Auksi 1995). In this book, Auksi
places 'the plain' in its historical context, arguing that the plain and not-plain
(elaborate, ornamented) have been implicated in struggles between people ever
since the Ancient Greeks, and especially in religious disputes. Auksi supports my
claim that 'the plain' is more usefully reconstituted as a process, that the term is
better conceived as a verb rather than a noun.
A second connection with modern social theory occurs at the point at which
we realise that plaining is not merely a pragmatic response to the complexity of
modern life but can also be regarded as spiritual, moral and ethical. Furthermore,
plaining provides a singular opportunity for Quakers to stand in the vanguard of
those who are able to critique one of the more damaging consequences of modernity: aestheticisation (Collins 2001). Astheticisation is the glossing of our environment with the thinnest veneer of 'the beautiful'-a gloss so pervasive that the
Gernun philosopher W clsch has argued that it blinds us to the difference between
the beautiful and the ugly (and probably between 'the good' and 'the bad')
(1997). I argue that the propensity to plain might provide Quakers with the
means to see through this process and avoid the an-aestheticization that is its
harmful result.
I shall go on, now, to introduce a third contextualisation. The French sociologist, Bruno Latour, argues that the term 'modern' (used to describe life in the
West since around 1750) designates two very different sorts of practice: first,
translation creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature
and culture; second, the set of practices he calls purijication creates two entirely
distinct ontological zones: human beings on the one hand and nonhumans on the
other (1993). Purification and translation, so long as they are kept separate, define
what it is to be modern. In this section I draw out the parallels between what
Latour calls purification and what I call plaining.
Webb Keane, an American anthropologist, argues that a key question that we
moderns have had to consider is 'What beings have agency?' (2007), a question
which can only be answered by sorting out the proper relations among words,
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things and subjects. This sorting out is fraught with moral implications and
involves the work of purification. The paradigmatic case is the antiritualism of
Reformation Protestantism, though such reform movements have taken place in
all major world religions. Such refonners aim to purify religion by replacing ritual
with beliefs and the resulting reforms are identified with modernity itsel£ Several
groups helped to complete the Protestant Reformation through their explicit
rejection of ritual (or liturgy). Quakers purified the practice of worship through
denying the possibility of the eucharist and of the sacraments in general. It was
primarily the fetishistic elements of the eucharist, the principle of 'real presence'
or transubstantiation, which Friends objected to: material things (Kantian 'thingsin-themselves') are just that, they cannot also be God, no matter how this is couched,
theologically. Things cannot be agents and it is the possibility of this (awful)
misconception that drove some protestants, Zwinglians and Salvationists as well as
Quakers, to deny the capacity of things to bear the weight of the sacred. In
Quakerism, ritual is replaced, from the outset, primarily by practice ('let your lives
speak').
Keane goes on to make two important points: first, that the assertion of purification can never be entirely successful. He refers to Latour, who observes that
even while moderns are trying to separate things, hybrids are proliferating, things
that mix nature and culture, things and humans: psychotropic drugs, hybrid corn
and frozen embryos, for example. But Latour tells us little about why this is happening. Keane suggests that both the ubiquity of so-called hybrids and the sense
of scandal they can generate have sources beyond the history of science and technology and can be traced, ultimately, to the religious sphere. Signs tenninate in
things after all. The materiality of semiotic form cannot be entirely eradicated and
to the extent to which it mediates even inner subjectivity, it renders full purifycation impossible. Things endure and plaining requires such things in order to
make them symbols ofless material qualities.
Keane's second point is that there is a significant moral element to Latour's
characteristion of modernity, specifically, that purification is driven by 'the sense
that there is something scandalous or threatening about the mixing of humans and
things, culture and nature' (Keane 2007: 23). Modernity, he argues, is often
represented as the outcome of a story of moral redemption (as in Quaker plaining). Latour, in focusing on the role of science in the creation of modernity,
largely ignores (according to Keane) the significance of religion by assuming that
it is just one more thing affected by purification. God, he observes, is eliminated
from the public scene and exiled to the individual's heart ('the light within' in
Quaker terms). Keane argues that if we place the work of purification within the
context of the Reformation attack on certain aspects of semiotic form (of Catholic faith and practice, for example), we may recognise a major source of its moral
impetus. It is not only the sociologist and anthropologist who position themselves
where roles, actions and abilities are distributed, those that make it possible to
define one entity as animal or material and another as a free and conscious
agent-this is also the task of the religious reformer, of George Fox and his
proseletyzing supporters, for example, who, perceiving themselves as standing on
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the religious frontier, set about making these distinctions. In doing so, they make
some of the core assumptions of their Euro-American world visible and reveal
some of the moral imperatives and anxieties these entail. And in struggling with
the proper place of objects in the lives of individuals, with the possibilities and
limits of human agency and with what is ethically acceptable, or even simply
believable, they take on problems which lie at the heart of modernity.
At the time of the Reformation, if words were bodily forms for meanings, they
were nonetheless superior to nonlinguistic forms-ritual, for instance. It became a
major issue to understand the nature of words and their distinction from concepts
and from things. However, in considering the Quaker case we must further consider the belief that there is that which is beyond words. The proper treatment of
language called for purification, which in the Quaker case meant its eradicationat least up to a point. Language cannot be suppressed entirely and in Quaker liturgy (for there are vestiges of liturgy remaining) language forces its way back in
through spoken ministry. Here we glimpse, at very close range, the parallels
between what I call plaining and what Keane (after Latour) calls purification.
However, the Reformation churches had the creed, a paradigm for subjective
agency. By taking the textual form, the creed makes religion highly portable
across contexts (it relies far less on material context). Although Quakers eschewed
creeds, they generated other forms of textualisation, including minutes of Business
Meeting, advices and queries and testimonies. The point is, however, that
Quakers, like other contemporary believers, opted for codification (Collins
2002d). Whereas Keane talks of the 'creed paradigm', we may talk of 'the
codification paradigm'-which is, in the same way, a part of the purification
process identified by Latour. But the work of purification goes well beyond the
content of doctrines. Creeds, or if we wish to include Quakerism here, codification, make beliefs available in the foreground. To put it bluntly, codification
(along with socialisation) serves to operationalise belie£
The view accorded to transcendance in traditions like Calvinism encouraged
efforts at abstraction, to play the materiality of semiotic form in order to arrive at
a disembodied spirit, a pure idea or an unsullied faith. This goal, however, cannot
reproduce itself without generating new semiotic forms. Latour says that the work
of purification inadvertently produces new hybrids. But why should that be?
Well, once semiotic forms are introduced into a social world, they become available as materials for experience on which further work is carried out. They can
become objects of reflection, sources of disciplinary practice, points of contention
or sources of anxiety. In 'doing away with' the material aspects of religion, the
reformers could not help but produce new forms-creeds, sermons, hymns,
houses of worship-even clerical garb. Such forms could never be fully confined
to their original contexts or definitively subordinated to their 'true' immaterial
meanings. They risked being fetishised, producing new hybrids. So, while purification contributed to the creation of the modem world, it can never, as Latour
argues, entirely succeed. The impossibility of attaining complete purification lies
precisely in the materiality of semiotic form-note the continual attempts to
achieve religious purification by the religions 'of the book'. The efforts of
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reformers, such as Fox, to 'strip away superstitions, instrumental reason, idolatry,
and fetishism' (Keane 2007) are justified in the name of greater spirituality on the
part of individuals. Even the most mystical of religions are bound to involve some
semiotic medium; in the case of Quakerism, the very denial of words begins as a
response to words and includes various ways of displaying that denial. Semiotic
form requires material instantiation and even though purification can never fully
succeed, it continues to appear. This helps us understand why plaining is necessarily a process-it is a project than can never reach completion.
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Quaker identity is learned and the learning process continues for as long as the
individual wishes it to. Some arc, of course, more eager and diligent learners than
others. Having convinced at least myself that it was the economy of narrative
grounded in an obligation to plain that best characterised Quakers and Quakerism, I began to wonder increasingly about the details, and especially the details
relating to the social processes through which these things arc learned. In recent
years, the term 'socialization' has fallen out of favour among sociologists. The
reason for this, most probably, is the rise and rise of Bourdieu's influence on the
discipline. In elaborating his theory of practice, Bourdieu wrote prolifically on a
wide variety of subjects (education, elites, photography, TV, suffering, art, social
stratification-to name just a few) but in doing so always drew on the same small
group of analytical constructs or 'tools' as he preferred to call them: habitus,
practice, capital and doxa. Habitus is not easy to define, and Bourdicu's often
dense, sometimes obtuse, prose docs not help. He explores the idea in considerable detail in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977). Here he writes :
The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations,
produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the
objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting
to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the
cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus (Bourdieu 1977: 78).

Given that Bourdieu specifically endows the habitus (and not the individual) with
agency, those who criticize the concept for its determinism would seem to have a
point. His attempt to transcend unhelpful dichotomies which have stymied progress in social theory, such as those generally abbreviated as objective/subjective
and agency/structure, ultimately fails. However, there is much in his development
of the notion of habitus which is thought-provoking and helpful. Probably the
most significant strength of the habitus as a means of representing the process of
socialisation is the fact that is it embodied, and that Bourdieu, himself, paid a great
deal of attention to this particular characteristic. Secondly, the habitus is clearly
established partly through interactions with the (built) environment. In relation to
the Quaker Meeting and its participants these are extremely useful insights. In
relation to Meeting for Worship, the epitome of what Dandelion (1996) economically calls 'Quaker time', both body and environment play a significant part,
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in both the generation of stories and in acts of plaining. This mode of analysis
(focusing on the habitus) confirms my earlier argument underlining the role of
nondiscursive interaction in and around the Meeting House. One's habitus is itself
embodied (one carries it around in one's head, as it were), but is embodied in a
more complete and convincing sense: Bourdieu introduces a second term hexis to
fix this aspect of embodiment. In the following passage he relates the embodiment
of the habitus directly to socialisation:
The child imitates not 'models' but other people's actions. Body hexis speaks directly
to the motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual
and systematic, because linked to a whole subsystem of techniques involving the
body and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values: in all
societies, children are particularly attentive to the gestures and postures which, in
their eye, express everything that goes to make an accomplished adult-a way of
walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and of using implements, always associated with a tone of voice, a style of speech, and (how could it
be otherwise?) a certain subjective experience (Bourdieu 1977: 87).

Let me comment on this extremely provocative account. First, much of this
rings true in relation to my fieldwork among Quakers. I would substitute 'newcomers' (or some such term) for children in that everyone new to Meeting
embarks on what is colloquially know as a 'steep learning curve'. Although, it is
possible that hexis may on occasion be a motor function purely and simply, that
need not always be the case. It is apparent in Meeting for Worship that participants observe one another, sometimes cautiously but on other occasions boldlychildren may jump down from their chair, walk across to another (adult) participant and stare at them, quite unselfconsciously. Which raises another point-the
degree to which hexis is assimilated consciously. During Meeting for Worship,
Quakers sit in a circle-the chairs or benches prearranged thus. Hexis (orientation
of body in this case) is 'given' and is adopted largely unconsciously by all but
newcomers. My field-notes suggest that the process cannot be entirely unconscious at least. It is possible for a participant to be 'disciplined' (spoken to by
another, usually senior, Member) if they transgress the norms of behaviour during
Meeting for Worship. Having said that, it is equally possible that one's posture in
Meeting, after attending for several years say, may well be adopted unconsciously
on each occasion. The point is that I think we must at least allow for the possibility of the conscious assimilation of hexis by Quakers in Meeting. Clearly, hexis is
a means of not only representing but of constructing one's identity whether as a
Quaker, a Sikh, Muslim or Shaker. In each case, the bodily disposition of the
adept (at least during worship) speaks of one's belongingness to this or that
community.
An interesting coda to this argument relates to Dandelion's interesting argument that the unity of Quakerism depends not so much on an overt, unifying
theology but on a behavioural creed. It is an argument that chimes strongly with
Bourdieu's idea of an embodied habitus. Dandelion is quite correct in pointing
out that Quakers appear to be doing the same thing (in Meeting for Worship) so
long as he acknowledges that participants in Meeting are not doing the same thing,
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and perhaps not even the same kind of thing. Participants in Meeting for Worship
at Dibdenshaw claimed to be praying, worrying, drawing up shopping lists,
reading, breathing evenly, meditating, puzzling things out and so on. Whatever
can be said about them, they are not doing the same thing, despite appearances to
the contrary. Dandelion's own fieldwork bears this out (see, for example, Dandelion 1996, 111; see also the booklet produced by Newcastle Meeting in 1998).
Bourdieu establishes a close link between the embodiment of habitus and the
built environment:

(
fj
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(

But it is in the dialectical relationship between the body and a space structured
according to the mythico-religious oppositions that one finds the form par excellence of the structural apprenticeship which leads to the em-bodying of the world
(1977: 89).

The extent and depth of socialisation processes would be far greater in the case
of the Kabyle among whom Bourdieu conducted fieldwork; however, the
processes described by Bourdieu are present in the Quaker case though less
explicit. Practically speaking, the Quaker habitus is at its most overt on Sunday
mornings. And although Quakers remain Quakers when they leave the Meeting
House, the habitus is reduced: they may be the only Quaker in their family, they
may work in a place where membership of any religious group is derided. Historically, however, the Quaker habitus would probably have been as all-embracing
and homogeneous at the Kabyle during the first 150 years of the movement.
I have written a good deal on the topic of the Meeting House and I do not
intend to repeat those arguments and observations here (Coleman and Collins
1996, 2006; Collins 1996a, 2006). I have tried to show how the narratives of
Meeting are manifested in the very fabric and furnishings of the Meeting House
itself-as I have already argued briefly above. The Meeting House concretises the
identity of Quakers. Habitus, as presented by Bourdieu, manifests both strengths
and weaknesses when applied to actually existing communities but it is far too
monolithic to account entirely for individual identity in the twenty-first century
(Collins 2008a).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: UNDERSTANDING QUAKER IDENTITY
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In Dandelion's terms (Dandelion 2008), plaining, habitus, narrative or heterotopia, for that matter (Pilgrim 2008) may be relatively stable tropes manifested by
Quakers across the centuries and I believe that there is plenty of evidence to
suggest that they are. However, the point I wish to emphasise here is that there
can be no single overarching interpretation by which we can come to understand
Quaker identity. The research undertaken by Simon Best (Best 2008) on adolescent Quakers and by Giselle Vincett on 'Quagans (Vincett 2008) is of particular
interest here. The practice of adolescent Friends and Quaker Pagans seems in
various ways to confound any attempt to generalise about Quakers. Understanding
or even describing the identity of individuals in the first years of the twenty-first
century is a difficult, perhaps impossible task. Nevertheless, this is the project in
which I have primarily engaged during the last decade. It just so happens that in
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my case, it was the Quaker Meeting and its participants that sparked this interest
and which provides my starting point for each new excursion into identity.
Quaker identity is sustained primarily through the generation and regeneration of
stories, primarily in and around the Meeting House but also elsewhere: these
stories, it should be remembered, are presented not only through the spoken and
written word, but through many other media: the body, the built environment,
clothing and other consumables, leisure pursuits and so on. It is just this concatenation of stories which comprise the Quaker Meeting and which lends an individual their Quaker identity, their Quaker self While Quakers live in the world
and interact both with those who arc Quakers and those who arc not Quakers,
this does not mean that Quaker narratives arc suspended away from the Meeting.
However, when presented they arc more implicit than they once were and are
therefore far less likely, nowadays, to be acknowledged and regenerated, restored,
rejuvenated, revitalised. In the seventeenth century, Friends manifested Quakerism very explicitly; to wear the Quaker grey, to eschew the standard greetings, to
refuse to doff one's hat, to thee and thou everyone one met regardless of their
social status, was to allude to narratives which were widely recognised, and more
often than not, condcnmed. The response of the non-Quaker, though sometimes
violent, was often equally overt and necessarily served to regenerate those narratives. Nowadays, religious faith and practice is primarily private: the stories that
are woven are primarily for the consumption of the group itself, and are legitimated by further stories, by those drawn from the canon, which are, of course,
also generated from within the group. Whatever the advantages and disadvantages
of this process arc for Quakers, fewer and fewer people find it fulfilling, and
membership has been in decline since the 1960s. Meeting narratives have always
been, at least to some extent, interwoven with those threads spun in the context
of wider society. Writing both as social scientist and Quaker, I believe that it will
be this process which, if sustained, may yet revitalise what remains an
extraordinary group.
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